Education in the United States

Yes i tried to explain why federal creditor guarantees had a crucial role in allowing risk build up mentioning the FDIC begin with, as the "original sin" of federal guarantees (the most on paper justified one) and I only got addressed on that and not on the overarching argument

Bro, you didn't have an overarching argument. Well, not one that anyone disagreed with, anyway. You were just belaboring the blindingly ****ing obvious.

lol yeah. If someone’s trying to sell me a chain that’s 90% steel and 10% paper I’m probably gonna ask about the paper parts. Guess that’s just laziness though. Should be asking about the carbon content of the parts that will never fail.

Yes. Is there some reason why you can't respond to the strong points?

There's a very old Russian/Soviet joke to that effect:

Market trader is selling rabbit stew.
Customer comes up and says "is this 100% rabbit"?
Market guy says "yeah, for sure"
"No horse in it?"
"Well, maybe a little horse, we all have to make a profit"
"Ok, how much horse?"
"Well, maybe 1:1"
"What, 1kg rabbit to 1kg horse?"
"No, one rabbit to one horse"

Is there some reasons you should post weak bs points in the first place ?

Can you answer the question? Why not respond to the strong points?

If you can't, is it because they are too strong and because you know you're wrong?

This is a very odd hill to die on. Pay your money, take your choice, I guess.

if I make a thesis and half of it it’s based on bs, why shouldn’t I be discredit ?
Aren’t I being disingenuous by trying to build a strong thesis using bs arguments ?
If you have such strong arguments to begin with like you said , why add all the craps ?
It shouldn’t be needed right ?

If 2+2= 4 , why would I need to add 1+3.5= 4 too ?

Ok !
But why the answer should be different between 5 and 50% ?

U just acknowledge the mistake and reiterate again the entire arguments without the flaws and see how it goes shrug !?

Which strong points do you want me to respond to? Did I contest what you believe to be the strong points? What if I disagree with the weaker points and agree (or at least don't disagree) with the stronger points? Am I supposed to argue about the stronger points in order to give myself cover to point out that the weaker points are, in fact, weaker?

Which 5% had issues?

If it is "****ing obvious" that it was regulations and the state to allow the build up of too much risk in the system then where are the posts saying "yes luciom you are right the state was the source of the problem much more than its solution so it is morally imperative to vastly reduce the power of the regulatory state for existential risk is caused by it, not solved by it, and anyone supporting the regulatory state is a direct threat society".

If it is ****ing obvious that libertarianism is right about finance where is the widespread agreement about it in this forum? Because I didn't see any

Well if you in fact agree that the regulatory system caused the worst financial crisis in 60 years it would be nice for you to say so yes, then we can move on how to reduce that problem (who to vote for example).

Wait rabbit meat costs less than horse meat in italy

It's an old joke. I guess in those days, rabbit was a delicacy.

As I have said to you in the past, I am probably more sympathetic to your views than most other posters here. I'm probably the definition of "a conservative" if that definition involves having some brains. You are really not doing anything that is sufficiently persuasive to get me on your side of the aisle.

Maybe it's the horse meat which not all countries eat I guess

Bubbles always existed in finance …
Way before the regulations you blame on too , existed .

Ever heard of tulip bubble for example ?
Or the rail road by bubble ?
Too much risk in the system just happens , with or without regulations .

I don't believe that the modern regulatory system was overwhelmingly responsible. It was one of a number of contributing factors, but not the most significant imo.

I don't believe that FDIC deposit insurance was a factor at all. I believe that government promotion of a home ownership was a contributing factor, as I said previously. I believe that the perception that government would bail out banks, especially banks that were perceived to be "too big to fail," was a contributing factor, although not as significant as you think it was. Both factors are better described as legislative rather than regulatory, but that's a bit of a quibble, I suppose.

You see it as a "quibble", but his dick is gonna get so hard that you agreed with him on something.

Don't you see the FDIC as the cornerstone of state creditor guarantees? It's existence, predicated on (on paper) reasonable assumptions, is what allows for all the rest.

Same as Marbury is behind all SCOTUS decisions in a way.

The FDIC is the bootstrapping of state intervention in financial markets at its core. It reverberates in every decision about financial market interventions

Is there some offer function of preventing bank run I don’t know about the FDIC ?
How is the state using fdic to Intervene in the financial market o0 ?

I don't really see it that way, and I think that implicit government guarantees of bank solvency was only a minor factor in the financial crisis.

There have been financial meltdowns that were caused by participants knowingly taking on excessive risk. But I don't think this was really one of those situations.

Mortgage originators didn't think they were taking on excessive risk because they were originating mortgages that they knew they could sell into securitizations. The lenders weren't intending to hold the risk, and in most cases, they weren't holding the risk. Issuers of MBS didn't think they were taking on excessive risk because, again, they were holding mortgages on their balances sheets for only a short period. They weren't intending to hold the risk long-term (except for perhaps the residual), and in most cases, they weren't holding the risk long-term.

Purchasers of AAA securities didn't think they were taking on excessive risk. Sure, the spreads on AAA MBS were wider than any other AAA paper you could buy in 2006, but it was still AAA paper. Most purchasers ran internal models and concluded that it was virtually impossible to break the AAA tranche, even if there was a historic decline in housing prices, historic levels of defaults, and historic loss severity.

What most market participants failed to anticipate were the knock-on effects, in particular the total lock up of credit markets and the extreme illiquidity in the market. Holders of AAA MBS found themselves in a situation where they simply couldn't exit their positions without taking a huge loss, even though, in many cases, their long term models showed that the securities would probably be OK if held to maturity. (As an aside, they weren't necessarily wrong. There was an extended period when AAA MBS were trading lower than they probably should have been trading. If you had a lot of cash, and you gobbled up a lot of that stuff at the right time in 2008, you made a lot of money.) And holders of those MBS usually had to mark those securities to market at fire sale prices, which caused all sorts of turmoil.