The no-limit hold ’em strategies suggestions in Decide to Play Great Poker by Annie Duke and John Vorhaus are often good. However, the explanations for them are frequently not. There are at least 20 statements that are either logically flawed or incomplete. I’ll list them here, usually with little or no comment. In a future article, I can discuss in more detail those which received the most feedback or disagreement on our forums.
- Page 18: “If you think they’ll be hard, then fold! If you think they’ll be easy, then play!” They are talking about the decisions involved with particular starting hands.
- Page 21: “Sevens and eights have a better chance of being the best hand even unimproved.......Those are easier hands to play.” They are comparing them to smaller pairs.
- Page 22: “Suited cards are functionally no better than unsuited cards.”
- Page 29: “Multiple calls (preflop) behind a raise paints a picture of progressively stronger hands.” Not in the games I play in.
- Page 39: “The number one reason for raising (preflop): to gain information.”
- Page 43: “Every hand performs better against fewer opponents.”
- Page 59: “If you’re in a game where raising isn't doing anything for you, limp away.”
- Page 66: Here, the book first offers the oft repeated idea that you should play tight in loose games and loose in tight games. And as I’ve written many times, this is only partially correct. You open looser in tight games and semi-bluff looser. You open tighter in loose games and semi-bluff tighter. But, you call tighter in tight games and looser in loose games. Overall, you tend to be tighter in tight games (but looser then your opponents) and looser in loose games (but tighter then your opponents).
- Page 85: It’s about this point in the book that they bring up a totally wrong method to calculate whether a raise is a good play. What they do is make a big distinction between hands that are worth at least a call and those that are not. For instance, if your opponent bets the pot and you are considering a pot size raise with a hand that would normally fold, you are considering laying 2-to-1. But if you are raising with a hand that should at least call, they say you are laying only even money since the call can be considered part of the pot. Thus, they say you should be more likely to raise with these hands.
- There are many problems with this flawed analysis. The big one being that they do not distinguish between hands that are borderline calls or folds and those that are not. Using their method, you would be much less likely to raise with a 32 percent hand (that normally folds) and a 34 percent hand (that normally calls). In actuality, there is almost no difference between these two hands when it comes to the profitability of a raise.
- Page 104: “It looks like you just gave him free money.” Here they run into a common misconception. Namely that when you bet a small amount into a draw, you are making that draw money (EV wise). But, you are not. You are getting even money on your bet and he is an underdog. Your bet hurts him. It just doesn’t hurt him as much as it would if it was large enough to force him to fold. It’s important to realize this because it means that it’s actually not correct to make sure that a possible draw against you is not getting the right price to call if such a bet will fold hands with few or no outs. If those hands are apt to call a bit smaller bet, your overall EV increases as long as there is some chance he has those hands rather than a good draw. This book repeatedly gets this wrong.
- Page 117: “When you set your average continuation bet at half the pot, you let the pot lay you 2-to-1 on that bet. Thus, your success rate on the C-bet has to be only 33 percent in order to break even.” The above math is correct only if you have two blank cards. If your hand will sometimes win a checked showdown, the math changes. A bet that will only win 33 percent of the time will cost you EV.
- Page 136: “When the action goes check, check, and the player to your right bets, it's as if you were heads-up.” This is clearly wrong. A similar error is made several places in the book when it recommends that a multiway pot that turns into a heads-up hand be played exactly as if it was head-up from the beginning.
- Page 148: “Say there’s $1,000 in the pot and you bet $9,000. You’re laying 9-to-1 on the pot which means that for every 10 times this scenario comes up, you have to win 9 just to break even.” This is horribly wrong. It would only be true if you never won when you were called. It’s also clear that this error was not just a typo because on the next page they elaborate by pointing out that people supposedly get bad psychological reinforcement for this play even though it succeeds only 85 percent of the time. As if 85 percent wasn’t enough.
- Page 209: “Don’t open the action with a hand that can’t stand to be raised.” Although the possibility of a check raise that will force a tough decision is sometimes a reason to check yourself, it’s by no means always the case. In fact, this is a risk often worth taking.
- Page 262: “But if you raise, you’re actually allowing him to have a good thing happen because now he can push and get something close to 2-to-1 from the pot.” They are talking about being against a flush draw on the flop. Basically, they are saying that it’s better to call a flop bet with the intention of betting out the draw when it misses on the turn, rather then raising the flop if it results in giving the draw 2-to-1 odds with two cards to come.
This sounds reasonable, but it’s usually mathematically incorrect. For example, suppose you flop a straight and a hand that you know to be a flush draw bets $600 into a $1,000 pot. You have $2,800 in front of you. If you just call, you will be able to get him to fold the turn the 80 percent of the time he misses. A call wins $1,600 eighty percent of the time and loses $600 twenty percent of the time. That’s an EV of $1,160.
$1,160 = ($1,600) (0.80) - ($600) (.20)
If instead, you move in, the flush draw will call getting 2-to-1 on a 36 percent shot. You will win $3,800 sixty-four percent of the time and lose $2,800 thirty-six percent of the time. That’s an EV of $1,424.
$1,424 = ($3,800) (0.64) - ($2,800) (0.36)
Here is another example where you should not be guided merely by the fact that your opponent is getting the correct price to call.
- Page 265: “So the only time it would be right to flat-call his lead on the turn is if you know your opponent isn’t creative enough to bluff (the river).” The idea is that against players like this you would call the turn, but fold to a river bet. That’s true. Except the book says that this is the only time to call the turn rather then raise with a pretty good hand. But this is not true. You should call the turn against players who could easily have a weak hand that will fold to a raise, but bluff the river if only called. Similarly, you should call against players who are apt to be weak and will fold to a raise fearing two bets, but will check and call a moderate bet on the river if they are not raised.
- Page 282: “This is a tell you can take right to the bank.” They are talking about a player who looks back at his hand to see whether one of his unsuited cards matches the board. You can take this tell right to the bank? Please.
- Page 312: “The other kind of flop that’s excellent to bluff at is a coordinated board, something like the Q
J 2
. If my opponent bets into me on that board, I’m calling 100 percent of the time with nothing.” Even though this is a good flop with which to “float,” calling anywhere near 100 percent of the time is insane. Good players will quickly pick up on this and exploit you to death. I will leave it to the reader to think of the various ways you can do this. - Page 347: “What would keep him from calling is his read that the min bet is exactly what it looks like — a desperate attempt to extract value with a hand he can’t beat.” Wouldn’t it be nice to find players who assume min bets aren’t bluffs?
- Page 388: Here, the book screws up a good concept with a bad example. It’s a tournament and you have 25 to 30 big blinds. A player in front of you moves in for 10 big blinds. They say you need not shove with the hands you play. If it is re-shoved after you act, you can get away from some of those hands. Perhaps so. Except that the example they use is pocket queens. No way you should fold that hand. I won’t insult the reader with an explanation.
I have a few other problems with the book besides those mentioned. I believe they are too paranoid about small flushes in heads-up pots. Such hands, in my experience, will make more money then they seem to think.
I also don’t like the fact that their sample flops are almost always ace high. When an overcard can come on the turn or river, the best strategy is often different then when it can’t.
And finally, I disagree with their idea that almost all players should set moderate stop loses in almost all situations. It’s true that a losing player is not at his best. But when a game is a lot better then routine, you’re giving up too much if you just walk away.
